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How has neuroscience affected  
lay understandings of personhood?  
A review of the evidence
Cliodhna O’Connor and Helene Joffe
University College London, UK
Abstract
The prominence of neuroscience in the public sphere has escalated in recent years, provoking questions 
about how the public engages with neuroscientific ideas. Commentaries on neuroscience’s role in society 
often present it as having revolutionary implications, fundamentally overturning established beliefs about 
personhood. The purpose of this article is to collate and review the extant empirical evidence on the 
influence of neuroscience on commonsense understandings of personhood. The article evaluates the scope 
of neuroscience’s presence in public consciousness and examines the empirical evidence for three frequently 
encountered claims about neuroscience’s societal influence: that neuroscience fosters a conception of the 
self that is based in biology, that neuroscience promotes conceptions of individual fate as predetermined, 
and that neuroscience attenuates the stigma attached to particular social categories. It concludes that many 
neuroscientific ideas have assimilated in ways that perpetuate rather than challenge existing modes of 
understanding self, others and society.
Keywords
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Introduction
On 17 July 1990, US president George H.W. Bush declared the 1990s to be the ‘Decade of the 
Brain’. The following years saw major advances in neuroscience as a discipline – most notably in 
the establishment of fMRI as a standard methodological instrument – and an explosion in the vol-
ume of neuroscientific research published. As the field has progressed, the subjects it tackles have 
become increasingly complex, with particular acceleration of research with potential social and 
policy implications (Illes et al., 2003). Subject matters traditionally assigned to the humanities and 
social sciences – such as religion, love, art, crime and politics – now make frequent appearances in 
neuroscience journals (Frazzetto and Anker, 2009; Littlefield and Johnson, 2012). The expansion of 
the neuroscientific research programme to topics of acute social concern has raised neuroscience’s 
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profile in society, propelling it into the public sphere. Neuroscience has been appropriated by many 
diverse fields that see it as relevant to their own interests, including law (Walsh, 2011), marketing 
(Chancellor and Chatterjee, 2011), public policy (Seymour and Vlaev, 2012), education (Ansari 
et al., 2012), parenting (O’Connor and Joffe, 2012) and economics (Schüll and Zaloom, 2011).
For social scientists, the increasing prominence of neuroscience provokes important questions 
about how members of the public engage with this new knowledge. This issue is often framed in 
‘deficit model’ (Wynne, 1993) terms, placing priority on evaluating the accuracy of public under-
standings of neuroscience (Herculano-Houzel, 2002; Pasquinelli, 2012; Sperduti et al., 2012). 
Whether a conception is scientifically correct or incorrect is, however, largely irrelevant to its 
substantive effect on people’s thinking about themselves, others and society. The most important 
consideration in gauging neuroscience’s societal influence is not lay ideas’ correspondence with 
established scientific ‘facts’, but the meaning attached to neuroscientific ideas in personal and 
social life. Since the brain is regarded as the organ most closely related to mind and behaviour, 
some have speculated that the proliferation of neuroscientific knowledge has produced a shift in 
everyday conceptions of personhood or ‘folk psychology’ (Goldman, 1993; Sousa, 2006). Given 
the significance of folk psychological understandings in guiding everyday behaviour, perception 
and social interaction, examining neuroscience’s influence on commonsense conceptions of per-
sonhood is arguably a more pressing task than establishing whether public understandings of the 
brain are scientifically correct.
Within discussions of neuroscience’s societal significance, it is commonplace to encounter claims 
that neuroscience is producing revolutionary changes in understandings of individuals and society. 
For example, Lynch (2009) claims that neuroscientific knowledge is ‘propelling humanity toward a 
radical reshaping of our lives, families, societies, cultures, governments, economies, art, leisure, reli-
gion – absolutely everything that’s pivotal to humankind’s existence’ (2009: 7). Similar sentiments, 
though less dramatically presented, are in evidence throughout the academic literature that reflects on 
neuroscience’s position in contemporary society. For example, Illes and Racine (2005) state that 
neuroscientific insights ‘will fundamentally alter the dynamic between personal identity, responsibil-
ity and free will’ (2005: 14); Farah (2012) asserts that ‘neuroimaging has contributed to a fundamen-
tal change in how we think of ourselves and our fellow persons’ (2012: 575); and Abi-Rached (2008) 
speaks of ‘this “neuro-age”’, whereby human behaviour and the other aspects that define us as a 
species are predominantly formulated in neurochemical terms’ (2008: 1162).
Such claims clash with established models of public engagement with science, which cast doubt 
on the notion that new scientific knowledge, within a relatively narrow time-span, provokes revo-
lutionary changes in public thinking. Social representations theory, one key paradigm for theoriz-
ing lay uptake of science, posits that the primary psychological task upon encountering new 
scientific information is ‘to make the unaccustomed familiar’ (Moscovici, 2008[1961]: 17) – that 
is, to transfer ‘strange’ new ideas into a conceptual register with which one is familiar and therefore 
comfortable. This is achieved by ‘anchoring’ the new idea within established cultural categories 
and ‘objectifying’ it with familiar symbols, images and metaphors. While different models of pub-
lic engagement with science employ different analytical tools, research from a variety of theoreti-
cal standpoints converges on the conclusion that people selectively attend to and interpret science 
in ways that cohere with their pre-existing values, identities and beliefs (Joffe and Haarhoff, 2002; 
Kahan et al., 2011; Morton et al., 2006; Munro, 2010; Wynne, 1993). New scientific information 
can indeed challenge and modulate existing understandings; however, it can also assimilate into 
and reinforce established ideas. It is therefore not self-evident that neuroscience will substantively 
alter understandings of personhood in predictable directions. Delineating the influences neurosci-
ence exerts on contemporary society requires careful empirical research.
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A body of research examining the role played by neuroscience in everyday conceptions of per-
sonhood has recently amassed. However – perhaps because it traverses several disciplines, meth-
odological approaches and fields of interest – it has thus far maintained a relatively low profile. It 
is often unacknowledged in scholarly or intellectual discussions about the cultural significance of 
neuroscience, with the result that such discussions remain largely speculative and polemical. 
The purpose of this article is to collate and review this empirical evidence concerning the 
influence of neuroscience on commonsense understandings of personhood. After probing the 
prominence of neuroscience in public consciousness, the article proceeds to examine the empirical 
evidence for three frequently encountered claims about neuroscience’s societal influence: that 
neuroscience fosters conceptions of the self that are dominated by biology, that neuroscience 
promotes conceptions of individual fate as predetermined, and that neuroscience abates the stigma 
attached to certain social categories.1
How prominent is neuroscience in public consciousness?
With neuroscience’s prominence in popular media escalating, several studies have undertaken to 
systematically examine the characteristics of media coverage of neuroscience. A recent analysis 
shows that references to neuroscience in UK newspapers increased sharply between 2000 and 2010, 
most often manifesting within advice on ‘optimizing’ brain function, demonstration of biological 
bases for intergroup differences, and recruitment of neuroscience’s scientific authority to ‘prove’ 
arguments or assertions (O’Connor et al., 2012). Regarding neuroscience’s practical applications, 
O’Connell et al. (2011) establish that the media show particular interest in applications involving lie-
detection, marketing and public policy. Racine, Waldman, Rosenberg and Illes’ (2010) analysis iden-
tifies three key trends in media coverage of neurotechnologies (e.g. fMRI, EEG, PET): neuro-realism, 
which refers to the use of neuroscientific information to make phenomena seem objective or ‘real’; 
neuro-essentialism, which connotes representations of the brain as the essence of a person; and neuro-
policy, which captures the deployment of brain research to support political agendas. Research also 
indicates a strong visual dimension to media coverage, with media text frequently accompanied 
by brain images produced by functional neuroimaging technologies (Dumit, 2004; Gibbons, 2007). 
The highly-mediated, technological nature of this image production is often obscured, such that 
the images may resemble direct photographs of neural activity (Beck, 2010; Roskies, 2007). 
These images may therefore afford a ‘truth value’ to the arguments proffered in media text.
The social significance of neuroscience’s expanding media presence is intensified by experi-
mental evidence suggesting that neuroscientific information may wield particular rhetorical force. 
Weisberg et al. (2008) show that explanations of psychological phenomena that include logically 
irrelevant neuroscience information are judged more satisfying than the same explanations pre-
sented without the neuroscience information. Similarly, McCabe and Castel (2008) document how 
articles summarizing cognitive neuroscience research appear more credible when accompanied by 
a redundant image of a brain scan than by a bar graph or no visual information. Three-dimensional 
brain images are particularly persuasive (Keehner et al., 2011). These experiments suggest that the 
symbols of brain research confer legitimacy on the arguments they accompany. However, it should 
be noted that these experiments required participants to evaluate fictitious scientific articles, which 
may not be a highly ecologically valid task. A more recent study focusing on evaluations of popular 
news articles reports that inclusion of fMRI images does not enhance an article’s persuasiveness 
relative to articles accompanied by other, or no, imagery (Gruber and Dickerson, 2012).
Research thus indicates that neuroscience is widely reported in the mainstream media and is 
convincing in certain experimental contexts. However, this does not guarantee that it has 
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meaningfully penetrated public consciousness. Evidence shows that there can be considerable 
divergence between media and mental representations of a scientific issue (Ten Eyck, 2005). 
People exposed to media information may ignore it, quickly forget it, or interpret and deploy it in 
idiosyncratic ways. Unfortunately, little research exists interrogating neuroscience’s prominence in 
the minds of the lay public. One exception is Wardlaw et al.’s (2011) survey of perceptions of neu-
roimaging applications, in which 17% of respondents report having ‘no awareness’ of neuroimag-
ing applications, 47% rate themselves as ‘a little aware’, 26% as ‘quite aware’ and 10% as ‘very 
aware’. These figures do not suggest extensive familiarity with neuroscience, and the level of 
public awareness they indicate may be inflated by the study’s recruitment strategies, which included 
advertising the survey on science blogs.
Some insight into neuroscience’s position in public consciousness can be derived from Rodriguez’s 
(2006) semantic analysis of usage of neuroscience-related terms in everyday speech. This analysis 
shows that neuro-vocabulary frequently materializes in vernacular language (e.g. ‘she is brainy’), 
suggesting that neurobiology occupies a space in the conceptual schemata that underpin people’s 
everyday talk. As Rodriguez (2006) acknowledges, however, the study provides limited insight into 
the breadth of this space or the meanings that speakers have in mind when they use ‘brain’ terms.
In summary, empirical research has established that neuroscience is increasingly visible in the 
popular press. However, little direct research with members of the public casts light on either the 
extent to which brain-related ideas are spontaneously recruited in naturalistic thought and conver-
sation, or the meanings that these ideas carry for people.
Does neuroscience foster a conception of the self that is based 
in biology?
Many commentaries on the societal significance of neuroscience have framed the issue within the 
historical battle between materialist and dualist theories of the person, that is whether what we call 
‘mind’ is fundamentally physical matter or exists separately from the body on some non-physical 
plane. Neuroscientific advances have been hailed as the force that will drive dualism from society, 
ushering in conceptions of self, emotion and behaviour that are entirely rooted in biochemical 
processes (Churchland, 1995; Churchland, 2008; Crick, 1995). Sociological writings suggest that 
the assimilation of biological information into conceptions of self and identity is already in motion, 
a position exemplified by terms such as ‘neurochemical self’ (Rose, 2007), ‘cerebral subject’ 
(Ortega, 2009) and ‘brainhood’ (Vidal, 2009).
The suggestion that understandings of the self are becoming progressively materialized has, 
however, met with limited empirical support. In an analysis of focus groups composed of indi-
viduals with varying degrees of involvement with brain research (e.g. neuroscientists, patients, 
teachers), Pickersgill et al. (2011) report that participants professed an interest in the brain, but 
rarely directly attributed behaviour entirely to brain processes. Some participants actively 
resisted neuroscientific ideas, perceiving them as threatening their established conceptions of 
mind and self – for example, undermining the importance of family and socialization in devel-
opment. This sense of threat was not universal, however, with others experiencing neuroscience 
as simply irrelevant to their self-perception. Choudhury, McKinney and Merten (2012) describe 
similar results from a study of how adolescents engage with the idea of the ‘teenage brain’: 
while teenagers stated that knowledge about the neuroscience of adolescence was important, 
they also rejected it as boring or irrelevant to their own self-understanding. Mirroring Pickersgill 
et al.’s (2011) findings, behaviour was rarely understood in purely biological terms, but rather 
seen as a product of relationships with parents, teachers and society more generally.
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Research with clinical populations indicates a greater penetration of brain-based ideas into self-
understanding. In Illes et al.’s (2008) survey of 72 patients diagnosed with major depressive disorder, 
92% reported that they would want a brain scan to diagnose depression if possible, while 76% 
believed that brain scans would improve their understanding of their mental state. Buchman et al.’s 
(2013) interviews with 12 individuals diagnosed with mood disorder revealed that participants very 
decisively endorsed the ‘chemical imbalance’ explanation of depression. Qualitative analysis indi-
cated that much of brain-based explanations’ appeal derived from their apparent ability to provide an 
objective, morally neutral tool to legitimize people’s experience. Dumit (2003) and Cohn (2004) 
suggest that the visual element of brain scans is a particularly potent legitimizing resource, allowing 
for the objectification of ‘depression’ or ‘schizophrenia’ as material entities rather than nebulous 
diagnostic categories. This ‘proving’ quality of neurobiological information can be mobilized in 
efforts to sustain a positive identity. Fein (2011), Rapp (2011) and Singh (2011), for example, observe 
that individuals with developmental disorders such as autism spectrum disorders (and their families) 
can adopt neuroscientific language to represent themselves as subject to unique, ‘hard-wired’ chal-
lenges and abilities. Such identity-protective positioning of neurobiological information also charac-
terizes the burgeoning ‘neurodiversity movement’. This campaign, spearheaded by the autism 
community, represents developmental disorders as simply alternative biological ways of being that 
are equally legitimate as ‘neurotypicality’ (Vidal, 2009). Thus, for people diagnosed with particular 
psychiatric conditions, neurobiological explanations of their thoughts and feelings are sometimes 
psychologically and socially functional, with their endorsement serving identity-supportive ends.
The divergent findings of research with clinical and non-clinical populations suggest that the 
brain’s prominence in self-understanding is largely contingent on whether a person has been pro-
voked to consider their ‘brainhood’ by extrinsic events such as diagnosis and medication. The brain 
may not intrude spontaneously in day-to-day consciousness, but rather becomes salient when 
something goes wrong (Pickersgill et al., 2011). However, even this experience-contingent salience 
is equivocal: neuroscientific explanations of disorder can be hotly contested (Martin, 2010) and 
rarely represent the exclusive explanatory mode deployed in conceptualizing the disorder. When 
neuroscientific ideas are accepted it is usually in partial and contingent ways, operating alongside 
alternative – sometimes contradictory – means of understanding experience. Bröer and Heerings 
(2013), for instance, employ a Q-sort methodology to establish that the disorder-understandings of 
adults with ADHD comprise a matrix of psychological, sociological and holistic concepts that exist 
alongside, and interact with, neurological conceptualizations. Gross’s (2011) ethnography of a 
neuro-oncology unit further indicates the multi-dimensionality of disorder meanings, finding that 
brain tumour patients’ self-conceptions are split into two elements: one that is based in, and another 
that is completely separate from, the brain. A form of Cartesian dualism allows these patients to 
conceive of the tumour not as an illness of the self but as the disease of ‘just another organ’.
Thus, even when biological explanations of thought, emotion or behaviour are accepted, they do 
not drive out non-biological explanations. Assertions that neuroscientific advances will inevitably 
purge society of dualistic understandings of personhood flounder because they fail to acknowledge 
the complexity and multi-dimensionality of self-conception.
Does neuroscience promote conceptions of individual fate as 
predetermined?
Neuroscience has also been marshalled in the long-standing philosophical battle between concep-
tions of the person as a free agent with independent volition and as a being whose character, behav-
iour and life-course are pre-patterned by their biological constitution. Certain philosophers and 
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neuroscientists have painted neuroscience research as the definitive refutation of the notion of free 
will, which is cast – in Nobel Laureate Francis Crick’s words – as ‘no more than the behavior of a 
vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules’ (Crick, 1995: 3). This debate can 
extend beyond questioning whether free will exists in an ontologically ‘real’ sense (an issue outside 
the scope of the present article) to encompass clear predictions about neuroscience’s influence on 
commonsense beliefs about free will. For example, Green and Cohen (2004) assert that ‘the net 
effect of this influx of scientific information will be a rejection of free will as it is ordinarily con-
ceived’ (2004: 1776), celebrating this as a socially progressive prospect. It is important to note that 
such postulations are not universal: many scientists caution against premature over-extrapolation 
of empirical results (Lavazza and De Caro, 2010; Rose, 2005; Roskies, 2006) and the potentially 
troubling societal repercussions of rejecting free will (Baumeister, Masicampo and DeWall, 2009; 
Vohs and Schooler, 2008). In addition, recent findings regarding the brain’s ‘plasticity’ or capacity 
for change have been interpreted as evidence against biological determinism. This will be dis-
cussed shortly; first, however, the article assesses the empirical evidence for the contention – still 
mooted from certain quarters (e.g. Churchland, 1995; Economist, 2006; Farah, 2012; Harris, 2012) 
– that the popularization of neuroscience will transform conventional understandings of free will.
One of the key social arenas in which the free will issue plays out is within attribution of respon-
sibility for behaviour. Legal and moral codes, along with daily interpersonal interaction, hinge on 
the conviction that individuals have control over, and hence responsibility for, their actions. Some 
have suggested that viewing behaviour as biologically determined fundamentally undermines the 
concept of personal responsibility. However, research shows that people confronted with behav-
iour that is framed as neurologically caused continue to interpret it through the lens of individual 
responsibility (De Brigard et al., 2009). Laypeople do not necessarily see moral responsibility and 
biological determination as incompatible, and are willing to attribute responsibility to an individual 
even when clear that (s)he did not intend their actions (Nahmias, 2006). Attribution of responsibil-
ity for unintended acts is particularly likely if they produce destructive outcomes or are morally 
‘bad’ (Alicke, 2008). This implies that the movement of neuroscientific evidence into criminal 
defence cases will not radically transform jurors’ reasoning (Rose, 2007; Schweitzer et al., 2011). 
Research thus suggests that attributions of responsibility are complex and multifaceted, and a 
direct ‘more neurologically determined–less personal responsibility’ effect appears unlikely.
Belief in personal responsibility persists because it is predicated on what Morris et al. (2001) call 
implicit theories of agency: robust cultural theories, transmitted across generations, defining the 
kinds of entities that act intentionally and autonomously to cause events. In western societies, the 
individual human intentional agent is unambiguously positioned as the primary and ‘natural’ causal 
force (Wellman and Miller, 2006); people socialized into western cultures often cannot conceptual-
ize how agency could operate at any level beyond the individual (Morris and Peng, 1994). Individual 
independence and self-determination is culturally valorised: the experience of possessing free will 
is positively emotionally valenced (Stillman et al., 2011) and people disfavour deterministic under-
standings of behaviour (Fahrenberg and Cheetham, 2000). It may be difficult for deterministic inter-
pretations of neuroscience to pierce such culturally embedded folk understandings. In fact, far from 
contradicting traditional assumptions, some writers have suggested that neuroscientific explanations 
dovetail with individualistic attribution, directing attention inside the individual skull (Choudhury 
et al., 2009; Vidal, 2009). Neuroscientific understandings may thereby support the continued neglect 
of the socio-structural contexts that shape actions, perceptions and emotions.
An emerging nuance in debates about neuroscience and determinism acknowledges that neuro-
science is a non-uniform body of knowledge, encompassing different ideas and approaches that 
could have differential societal effects. The implications of the brain for understandings of 
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determinism/free will depend on what type of brain is represented. A key dimension here relates to 
whether neural structure and function are seen as genetically pre-programmed or as ‘plastic’ and 
thereby modulated by experience. The latter representation has recently come to prominence and 
has been proclaimed the biological condition for individual agency, the idea being that neuroplas-
ticity facilitates the ability to initiate self-change (Papadopoulos, 2011; Pitts-Taylor, 2010). Some 
argue that neuroplasticity also has political implications: if the brain is the seat of beliefs and emo-
tions, then if the brain is malleable so too must be identity and concurrent societal processes 
(Thornton, 2011).
The concept of plasticity has assimilated into popular arenas, manifesting particularly in 
exhortations to ‘boost’ or ‘train’ one’s brain (O’Connor et al., 2012; Pitts-Taylor, 2010). This 
trend represents the brain as a resource whose efficacy is contingent on its owner’s actions: indi-
viduals can enhance their neural function through nutrition, mental exercise or artificial means 
(e.g. pharmaceuticals), or endanger it through exposure to risky activities or substances. While 
the salience of these messages in media dialogue has been empirically established (O’Connor 
et al., 2012), the extent to which people endorse them in everyday life remains unclear. Most 
investigative attention has focused on pharmaceutical enhancement of neural performance, a 
practice portrayed as widespread by commentators in the media (Forlini and Racine, 2009; 
Partridge et al., 2011) and academic literature (Farah et al., 2004; Schanker, 2011). Some data 
indicate substantial levels of unprescribed neuro-pharmaceutical use within certain populations 
– for example, university students (Smith and Farah, 2011) – though other studies suggest it is 
rare (Coveney, 2011). Uptake of pharmaceutical enhancement may, however, represent some-
thing of a red herring in evaluating the depth of engagement with brain optimization: more 
likely, it is via less extreme and costly practices – such as purposefully changing nutritional 
patterns or attempting crossword puzzles – that the logic of brain enhancement most deeply penetrates 
everyday life. As yet, no research with lay populations assesses receptivity to non-pharmaceutical 
brain enhancement, though sales figures for electronic ‘brain-training’ devices indicate a rapidly 
expanding market (NeuroInsights, 2009).
The prominence of the notion of plasticity could be interpreted as liberating, conveying that 
individuals can control their neurological destinies. However, some have voiced concern that 
plasticity places ultimately repressive demands on individuals to ‘maximize’ their untapped neuro-
logical potential (Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Thornton, 2011). Brain optimization ideas appear to cohere 
with the contemporary zeitgeist of self-improvement, at the root of which lie concerns about self-
control, a cardinal value in western cultures (Joffe and Staerklé, 2007). In recent times, demands 
for self-control have been most vocally articulated within the health domain: ‘healthism’ pertains 
not only to physical health but to establishing oneself as a virtuous, disciplined citizen (Crawford, 
2006; Rabinow, 1992). One works on the self through working on the body. The language and 
substantive content of appeals to brain optimization echo the central ethos of contemporary health 
discourse, emphasizing individual responsibility and lifestyle choices (Blaxter, 1997; Crawford, 2006). 
The brain is emerging as a new site at which efforts to achieve self-control and self-improvement 
can operate. Much of the brain optimization discourse has coalesced around the topic of dementia, 
the promised aversion of which stands as the most compelling incentive for ‘brain-training’ 
(Palmour and Racine, 2011; Williams et al., 2011). The fear dementia elicits can be largely traced 
to a perception that it dissolves personal identity, independence and self-determination (Van 
Gorp and Vercruysse, 2012). Public dialogue thereby conveys that disciplined regimes of brain 
optimization can stave off the ultimate, permanent loss of self-control. Thus, much popular 
discussion of the brain appears to reiterate a cultural ethic of self-control. How this translates 
into everyday experience remains unclear, however, as analysis of the self-control ethic in media 
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discourse has not been accompanied by research that directly examines how individuals engage 
with these ideas in daily life.
The suggestion that the diffusion of neuroscience will erode belief in free will therefore appears 
unsubstantiated. Deterministic ideas collide with deeply entrenched cultural understandings of 
individual responsibility and self-control, and as yet little evidence suggests that these values will 
buckle under the pressure. Indeed, it seems more likely that neuroscientific information is being 
co-opted into these value systems, rejuvenating them and driving them forward within superficial 
reframings.
Do neuroscience explanations reduce stigma?
A frequent context through which neuroscience manifests in society is the explanation of human 
variation, with observed differences between particular categories of people traced to reported dif-
ferences in their neurobiological characteristics (Choudhury et al., 2009; Dumit, 2004; O’Connor 
et al., 2012). Systems of social categorization infringe on all stages of neuroscience research: from 
the selection of research topics – for example, investigating whether the predefined categories of 
criminals, adolescents or schizophrenics have distinctive neurological features; to research meth-
odology – particularly in specifying the demographic variables to be factored into sample composi-
tion and the parameters of ‘normality’ that constitute an appropriate control sample; and research 
interpretation – as seen in the formal labelling of autistic traits as ‘male’ (Jack and Appelbaum, 
2010). Neuroscience thus invokes and reproduces certain assumptions about social categories. 
Through what philosopher Ian Hacking (1995) describes as a ‘looping effect’, classifying people 
works on them and changes them, altering how they think about themselves and how others per-
ceive them. If neuroscience is implicated in cultural efforts to delineate ‘types’ of people, how 
might this affect social identities and intergroup relations?
Some evidence suggests that new social identities are forming around neuroscientific informa-
tion. As neurobiology has supported new classifications (e.g. certain psychiatric diagnoses) there 
have been instances of concomitant collective mobilization, with people assembling around 
shared neurobiological explanations to advocate for research, treatment and services (Novas and 
Rose, 2000). The aforementioned neurodiversity movement exemplifies this. Advocacy groups 
across a broad range of issues – for example, addiction, mental illness, juvenile justice and homo-
sexuality – have embraced neuroscientific explanations, hailing their potential to divert society 
from a discourse of blame and moral condemnation (Corrigan and Watson, 2004; Hall et al., 2004; 
Walsh, 2011). Research with mentally ill populations has shown that patients themselves expect 
biomedical explanations to reduce the stigma they encounter (Buchman et al., 2013; Easter, 2012; 
Illes et al., 2008). Neuroscientific framings of behaviour – for example, representing addiction or 
mental illness as brain diseases – are thus widely expected to promote tolerance towards tradition-
ally stigmatized groups.
The actual effect of neuroscientific explanations on orientations towards stigmatized groups 
may, however, be considerably more complex. Research on attitudes to mental illness indeed 
indicates that attribution of undesirable behaviour to biological factors reduces blame (Corrigan 
and Watson, 2004; Mehta and Farina, 1997; Rüsch et al., 2010). However, biomedical attributions 
for mental illness are also linked to increases in social distance (Bag et al., 2006; Dietrich et al., 
2006; Read and Harré, 2001; Rüsch et al., 2010), perceived dangerousness (Corrigan and Watson, 
2004; Dietrich et al., 2006; Read and Harré, 2001; Walker and Read, 2002), fear (Dietrich et al., 
2006), perceived unpredictability (Walker and Read, 2002) and harsh treatment (Mehta and 
Farina, 1997). Longitudinal analysis of public attitudes shows that increased endorsement of 
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biomedical explanations of mental illness has not been accompanied by increased tolerance 
(Pescosolido et al., 2010). Aside from mental illness, unfavourable correlates of biological expla-
nations have also been detected for attitudes regarding gender (Brescoll and LaFrance, 2004; 
Morton et al., 2009), race (Jayaratne et al., 2006; Williams and Eberhardt, 2008) and obesity 
(Teachman et al., 2003). Furthermore, some data suggest biological explanations operate as self-
fulfilling prophecies for those to whom they are applied, for example undermining women’s 
mathematical performance (Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2006), increasing overweight individuals’ 
calorie intake (Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011) and promoting fatalism among mentally ill people 
about their prospects of recovery (Easter, 2012; Lam and Salkovskis, 2007).
In a comprehensive review, Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) attribute the negative social conse-
quences of biological explanations to the operation of psychological essentialism.2 Wagner, Holtz 
and Kashima (2009) define essentialism as the attribution of a group’s characteristics to an unalter-
able and causal ‘essence’, which involves (i) establishing discrete, impermeable category boundar-
ies; (ii) perceived homogeneity within the category; (iii) using the essence to explain and predict 
the group’s surface traits; and (iv) naturalization of the category. Representations of neuroscience 
currently circulating in society conform to these trends, with long-established stereotypes of 
particular social groups (e.g. women, overweight people, adolescents) reconstituted as invariable 
features of their natural constitutions (Fine, 2010; Kelly, 2012; O’Connor et al., 2012). Essentialism 
has destructive effects on intergroup relations, promoting a sharp ‘us–them’ split in which particu-
lar groups are marked out as biologically ‘other’. Dumit (2003, 2004) and Buchman et al. (2010) 
argue that neuroimaging data have been particularly effective at constructing this ‘otherness’: it is 
commonplace both in academic and popular literature (on, for example, addiction) to encounter 
two differently coloured brain images placed side by side, establishing a categorical distinction 
between ‘the normal brain’ and ‘the addicted brain’. There is little sense of addiction as a spectrum; 
rather, addicts are homogenized as almost a different species. Neuroscience may thus promote 
essentialistic representations of social groups and incite concurrent movements towards stigmati-
zation and discrimination.
The consequences of neuroscience for attitudes to social groups cannot be characterized as 
unambiguously positive or negative. The effects of neurobiological frames seem to vary between 
domains: for example, effects are generally more promising for attitudes to homosexuality than 
race, gender, mental illness or obesity (Haslam and Levy, 2006; Jayaratne et al., 2006). Effects also 
vary within domains: for example between different mental disorders, with tolerance most com-
promised when the disorder purportedly involves violence (Schnittker, 2008). However, it seems 
unlikely that neuroscientific explanations will eradicate stigmatizing or prejudicial understandings 
of social groups. In some cases, neuroscientific explanations of human difference may reinforce, 
rather than dismantle, the social and symbolic boundaries that separate categories of people.
Conclusions
Lynch (2009) contends that we are on the cusp of a ‘neurorevolution’ whose effects will eclipse the 
great societal revolutions – agricultural, industrial and informational – that history has thus far 
witnessed. However, the bulk of the evidence reviewed above suggests that claims that neurosci-
ence will dramatically alter people’s relations with their selves, others and the world are overstated. 
In many cases, neuroscientific ideas have assimilated in ways that perpetuate rather than challenge 
existing modes of understanding. This is perhaps not surprising: beliefs relating to free will, self-
control, individual responsibility and essentialism are entangled in dense networks of cultural nar-
rative and symbolism and are consequently likely to prove obdurate. These beliefs are, however, 
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not entirely inviolable, with the research reviewed above also documenting instances where tradi-
tional understandings – for example, in the self-conceptions of psychiatric patients – have been 
modulated by neuroscientific information, even if in partial and contingent ways.
This review shows that many empirical questions remain about neuroscience’s influence on lay 
conceptions of personhood. Uncertainties linger over issues as basic as whether the public are 
aware of neuroscience: is the media’s attentiveness to neuroscience reflected in ordinary thought? 
While existing evidence indicates it is unlikely neurobiology will come to dominate folk psychology, 
might certain factors (e.g. individual differences or socio-demographic variables) differentially 
promote acceptance or rejection of neuroscientific understandings? Incorporating neurobiological 
information into self-perception is more likely within clinical populations, but even here neurobio-
logical explanations are not absolute: how do they interact with other non-biological understandings? 
Media analysis suggests that neuroscience is assimilating into existing ideologies relating to free 
will, responsibility and self-control, but is this mirrored in ordinary thinking about these issues? 
Finally, while existing data cast doubt on neuroscience’s potential as a stigma-reduction mechanism, 
research on biological essentialism has concentrated largely on mental illness. As neuroscientific 
categories move beyond the clinical domain – for example, into criminality, personality, gender 
and sexuality – their effects on attendant social identities and intergroup relations must be closely 
tracked.
The cumulative implication of the research reviewed in this article is that neuroscience’s 
cultural influence cannot be evaluated in terms of a single narrative about personhood that it 
imposes on society. The neuroscientific ideas that reach the public sphere do not encounter pas-
sive receptacles of information, but active audiences who approach it through the lens of pre-
existing worldviews, assumptions and agendas. Neuroscience is open to a multiplicity of 
interpretations and uses in society, and has a corresponding multiplicity of effects. For social 
scientists, this means that the critical priority for forthcoming investigation must revolve around 
disentangling the contingencies under which neuroscience exerts (or does not exert) distinctive 
impacts. Necessary developments include complementing analysis of neuroscience in the media 
with examination of its manifestation in personal lives; more extensive investigation of engagement 
with neuroscience within non-clinical populations; and departure from the hitherto near-exclusive 
focus on developed, western societies. Ongoing debates about the cultural significance of neu-
roscience should closely attend to such research developments, thereby supporting a dialogue in 
which the nuances of the domain are openly acknowledged and empirical findings prioritised 
over polemic and speculation.
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Notes
1. To provide some procedural detail on the literature review: the collection of literature on neuroscience 
and lay understandings of personhood reviewed here was amassed gradually over a two-year period. 
Relevant papers were identified via periodic keyword searches (using search-terms such as ‘neuroscience 
& self’, ‘neuroscience & society’, ‘neuroscience & identity’) of electronic databases (e.g. Social Science 
Citation Index, SCOPUS), and the bibliographies of papers thus acquired were examined to procure 
additional references. An electronic database was set up to store the literature gathered. This database was 
organized into folders based on papers’ subject matter (e.g. ‘neuroscience in the media’, ‘neuroscience 
and clinical categories’), with new folder categories created as required by incoming papers. The set of 
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categories in the database thus provided a broad overview of the literature’s primary preoccupations. The 
majority of the categories addressed one of four overarching issues: neuroscience’s public prominence, 
its influence on self-conception, its implications for deterministic beliefs and its effects on social stigma. 
These four issues set the structure for the present article.
2. Though Dar-Nimrod and Heine’s (2011) review centres on the effects of genetic explanations, many of 
its conclusions can be generalized to neurobiological explanations (Haslam, 2011).
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